But couldn't it be argued that the use of body-scanners functions as a form of strong deterrent for potential plots? If a potential terrorist understands that they will eventually be caught or that the stakes to beat the system are too high, they will look at alternative forms of terrorism simply because the investment to beat airport security is too high.
But couldn't it be argued that the use of body-scanners functions as a form of strong deterrent for potential plots?
No, because there have been attempts that the scanners have not caught, and were thwarted not by the TSA, nor any government agency, but by other passengers. Know thy history, I'm not even accounting for the white-hat tests that the TSA has soundly failed.
And to sort of extend my point. We always laugh at CEOs/CTOs when they fail to provision money/resources for security software and security measures in organizations. That, instead of paying for security up-front, they wait until after a disaster to respond with security measures.
In this case, by criticizing the spending of scanners as a deterrent to potential plots, are we not playing the part of CEO who complains about a small security expense as opposed to waiting until after a disaster to respond?
The crux is what constitutes "small security expense". Locked hardened cockpit doors are cheap. Arming pilots is cheap. $1B for a fleet of marginally effective scanners isn't cheap.
When the cost of security exceeds the cost of what's being protected, the solution need be reconsidered.
Keep in mind that we are equally critical of CEOs and CTOs who spend money on the wrong things e.g. the classic "We have antivirus software installed, therefore we are secure from hackers!" AV software does nothing to protect your network from a vulnerability in sendmail.
Similarly, the nude scanners would have done very little to stop the 9/11 hijackers, whose weapons were simple and equivalent weapons could be improvised from items that anyone can find on the other side of a checkpoint. Whatever we were doing in August 2001 to stop less-determined attacks was working back then and would work equally well today. The simplest conclusion is that whatever else is being done to stop a 9/11-style attack is working, and that the checkpoints are just a distraction.
Not that we should be surprised by that. The TSA was going to allow people to carry small knives through the checkpoints, and noted that you are already allowed to carry far more dangerous items through -- except for box cutters, because of their appearance. Then there was an outcry from people who are terrified of knives being on airplanes, and so the policy change never happened. With that kind of logic, it is a stretch to say that the checkpoints are keeping us safe.
You're assuming a number of seemingly questionable propositions about "potential terrorists". Do they really care more about personal outcomes than mission outcomes? (I might not mind that I'm caught, if my colleagues succeed before they are caught.) Do they really care so much about "high stakes"? (If I'm comfortable with martyrdom I may be comfortable with a number of other outcomes.) Are they actually so willing to substitute "alternative forms of terrorism" for the sorts of acts that have been successful before? Do they care about returns on "investments"? (Those who fund operations may be civilians in some sense, and not the same people who take decisions regarding the use of those funds or of other resources.)
Besides, the point about alternatives is problematic in other ways. If vast public resources are expended moving problems from one location to another location, were those resources well spent?
True. In the 1970's back when boarding a plane was as casual as boarding a metro bus, commercial flights were routinely hijacked by amateurs so often it became a joke. Passenger screening was started in response to that, and it was real. Whether every screening practice today is effective is debatable but no screening at all would be open mike night for any crank with a grievance.
"couldn't it be argued that the use of body-scanners functions as a form of strong deterrent for potential plots?"
Not when all the materials one needs to construct a dangerous weapon are available on the other side of the checkpoint. Go to the duty-free shop and buy a glass bottle, and now you are ready to make a shiv.
For that matter, you have lots of sharp metal things and dangerous chemicals in your laptop, and you can walk through security with that.
I doubt the 9/11 hijackers would be deterred by the nude scanners. Sure, you would stop them from bringing a box cutter through (maybe), but there are a dozen other weapons they could have carried through or procured past the checkpoint. The nude scanners might catch someone who is trying to sneak a gun through security, but so do metal detectors -- and metal detectors might even do a better job.
The problem is there are too many entry points into an airport. If you wanted to get a device into an airport and on a plane, you can. It might not be quite as simple as walking it through the security gates, but it can be done. The body scanners will only deter the "monday morning" terrorist. But anyone putting any amount of thought and planning into it won't be deterred.
No, because the first time they try and are successful they expect to die so they don't care what will happen if they 'eventually' get caught there will be no second try for them.
