AF447 is often misunderstood, there simply is no easy root cause for that particular accident. Or any other aerospace accident, it always is a combination of multiple factors.
That the instruments readings were contradictory is indisputable, but when the anti-stall alarms are blaring in the cockpit, and the plane is literally falling from the sky for 3.5 minutes, than pulling the stick full back is not the way to go. In fact, pulling the stick back, even when applying full power, never has been, and never will be the way to get out of a stall.
The Thales pitot tubes were clearly faulty. The flight system output was absolutely contradictory. But understanding which instruments and which readings a pilot could potentially rely on in such a situation goes down to fundamental, basic airmanship. And for that, the blame lays solely on Air France and on their pilot training.
Pulling back to avoid overspeed is important, but stalling is certain death. And if the VMO and flutter flight-test videos are anything to go by the plane will definitely let the aircrew know they are getting there.
Agreed, the crew was confused and stuck in bubble where they believed pulling up would get them out of a stall, it didn't. Until the very end, they didn't come to the correct conclusion.
Again, training, alarm logic combined with a, in itself trivial equipment failure, led to the disaster. Picking only one of those factors, and all those I didn't mention, is just ignorant.
> In fact, pulling the stick back, even when applying full power, never has been, and never will be the way to get out of a stall.
It works perfectly well in an Airbus when operating in normal law AIUI because of envelope protection. The problem is that it doesn't work in alternate law which was the active mode at the time. It suddenly became necessary to control the aircraft like a "real" aircraft without a computer altering the inputs, and the pilots weren't prepared for that.
