Not really? Encrypted sessions block the trivial attack of just watching the secret go across the bus. Pushing people to MITM attacks is already an improvement, and while generating initial trust in the TPM for that purpose isn't straightforward, it's not impossible. The almost universal implementation of TPM-backed secret management isn't secure against physical attack, but that's very different to "insecure by design". All the primitives to make this work reasonably are there, OS and firmware vendors just aren't using them.
Yes really. The lack of any working implementation in production systems is an issue (D-RTM + encrypted sessions), something that Apple has done in an equivalent threat model since the iPhone 11. You can argue that "insecure by design" doesn't apply because there is a secure design in the abstract but the fact that nobody has adopted it in 20 years says something about the design itself.
It's _also_ insecure by design because in every deployed implementation (including with PIN), it is S-RTM meaning that _any_ UEFI driver vuln will compromise your TPM key. Yes, any UEFI vulnerability in its countless vendor drivers, USB stack, network stack, etc.
>All the primitives to make this work reasonably are there, OS and firmware vendors just aren't using them.
To be precise, both Windows (according to the article) and Linux+systemd (since systemd v251) support letting the user specify a TPM PIN and then use parameter encryption. But yes, both make it optional.
