I think when we change the laws, we should compensate those who lose out from the change. By giving people the assurance that the laws will either remain the same, or they will be compensated if a change in the law incurs for them losses in their investment, people will be encouraged to invest more of their time and money in endeavors in our society. Regulatory/institutional stability is a related concept and widely considered by economists to be an important contributor to economic development.
As for the moral argument, I find it hard to believe that individuals should know that the laws that society collectively agreed on and implemented, are unjust. To some extent we rely on society to inform us of right and wrong, and there is no clearer example of that expression than the laws and policies the government institutes through at the behest of elected representatives.
So I think the fault of unjust laws, where they exist, should fall on society as a whole, as opposed to those who as a matter of circumstance, just happened to make investments of time or money that depended on those laws.
Finally, not compensating landowners means far more political opposition to instituting such a tax, and therefore delays in doing so, and that in itself is costly. Consequently, insisting on landowners being punished for benefiting from the legal status of land ownership will be harmful to society. It would be a case of prioritizing vengeance over society's wellbeing.
no, investors need no additional incentive to invest. they squarely chose to take the risk, and will do so regardless of boondoggles like this, because they have no better alternative (i.e., opportunity cost impels them). it's the same fallacious argument used to keep progressive taxes at bay (oh noes, the rich people will leave america for... ???). let them fail. it's not a social problem in the slightest. the social safety net should cushion those at the bottom, certainly not those at the top, or in most cases, not even those in the middle.
certainly it means more political opposition in the form of money, but not in votes, which is the more pertinent metric.
>>no, investors need no additional incentive to invest.
That is not true. Greater incentives translates to more investment, and more investment is socially beneficial.
>>it's the same fallacious argument used to keep progressive taxes at bay (oh noes, the rich people will leave america for... ???).
There is nothing fallacious about this argument. Disincentives to investment lead to less investment. Less investment means less gains in productivity and wages, which also means less taxable income that can support the mandatorily funded safety net leftists support.
>>certainly it means more political opposition in the form of money, but not in votes, which is the more pertinent metric.
Historically, measures that threaten major special interests are difficult to pass due to the opposition they face. Ignoring that is putting ideology ahead of pragmatic results.
no, investment may move, but it doesn't simply vanish. wealth managers would be fired for holding investible funds in cash (which is what withholding investment means--that's the opportunity cost mentioned earlier).
>>no, investment may move, but it doesn't simply vanish. wealth managers would be fired for holding investible funds in cash (which is what withholding investment means--that's the opportunity cost mentioned earlier).
The percentage of income invested fluctuates, based on factors that include security of property rights and expected return on investment.
Creating a reliable regulatory and tax regime would mean greater annual inflow of money into investments.
All the better then to remove the obstacles to the enfranchisement of the masses, by offering compensation to the current beneficiaries of rent-extracting institutions in exchange for recruiting them in the drive to abolish these institutions.
Violent revolutions that overturn power structures are actually quite rare and far more common is persistence of structural forces of rent-extraction for decades or centuries, and thus the threat of revolution is not an effective motivator for those in power to relinquish their privileges. The pragmatic reality is that we are more likely to get to a more just and efficient economy without these structures if we reach a settlement that removes the opposition of these structures' beneficiaries from the drive to eliminate them.
>>bonus point: a more equitable distribution of wealth would lead to smarter investment overall and a more productive economy.
Another bonus of eliminating rent-seeking institutions is that it reduces wealth inequality. Compensation to expedite the removal of a structural force that contributes to wealth inequality would likely be a net-gain for equity in the distribution of wealth, because the former is a one-time action while the latter has a recurring impact.
no, those are poor economic prescriptions that further entrench wealth in fewer hands to the detriment of the economy as a whole. investment will happen regardless. the money literally has nowhere else to go. this is really not a hard or controversial point.
investors and politicians, on the other hand, like to say things like "investment will go away", but those are lies told to the susceptible to get pet policies enacted, not to reflect reality, better the economy, or improve the lives of ordinary citizens.
history books are literally chocked full of governments being overturned, and it's happened dozens of times in the past century. it's anything but rare.
>>no, those are poor economic prescriptions that further entrench wealth in fewer hands to the detriment of the economy as a whole.
These are proven economic prescriptions that expedite the removal of costly encumberences to increasing the efficiency of the market and reducing rent extraction by the few.
>>investment will happen regardless. the money literally has nowhere else to go.
You don't seem to understand the point I'm making. Some percentage of income is invested. That represents investment inflow, that leads to capital formation. The percentage varies between countries and eras, based on factors like the average ROI rate, tax/regulatory stability, and security of property.
It stands to reason that more tax/regulatory stability would lead to a larger percentage of income being invested.
>>investors and politicians, on the other hand, like to say things like "investment will go away", but those are lies told to the susceptible to get pet policies enacted, not to reflect reality, better the economy, or improve the lives of ordinary citizens.
You're allowing conspiracy theories to overwhelm your thinking. Your certainty in bad faith motivating these arguments is causing you to not even comprehend the arguments before you reject them, as in the case of you not making the minimal effort to understand my point about a variable rate of investment that's dependent on multiple factors.
>>history books are literally chocked full of governments being overturned, and it's happened dozens of times in the past century.
There have been hundreds of states in existence at any one time for the last several millennia. Many instances of a type of event does not imply that this event is common. The fact is, relative to how many states exist, and how large of a time period most historical analyses cover, the number of successful revolutions by the lower classes is very few, and thus the event is rare in the context how likely it is that it will occur in any one country in a given era.
There is nothing to buy with your social safety net payments unless investors are taking risks on the businesses that make and sell it. You can't just abolish private property from within capitalism and leave it there. Once you have taken that step you have to go all the way to state-controlled production.
Although again, the Georgist point is that this is specifically not true for land: the land is there whether you invest in it or not.
As for the moral argument, I find it hard to believe that individuals should know that the laws that society collectively agreed on and implemented, are unjust. To some extent we rely on society to inform us of right and wrong, and there is no clearer example of that expression than the laws and policies the government institutes through at the behest of elected representatives.
So I think the fault of unjust laws, where they exist, should fall on society as a whole, as opposed to those who as a matter of circumstance, just happened to make investments of time or money that depended on those laws.
Finally, not compensating landowners means far more political opposition to instituting such a tax, and therefore delays in doing so, and that in itself is costly. Consequently, insisting on landowners being punished for benefiting from the legal status of land ownership will be harmful to society. It would be a case of prioritizing vengeance over society's wellbeing.