"The land tax amount needs to be high enough that the pain of the tax effectively forces owners to improve what's on the land"
The author likely isn't aware of that. If the author made that argument then it would undermine their argument about affecting people's choices minimally or not at all.
The carbon price and dividend shows a great example of how to correctly set incentives.
You tax the carbon. That tax money is then put into an account. At the end of the year, every single individual is then given an equal share. The disincentives the use of carbon, while at the same time providing means that a majority of people actually get a net benefit.
The land tax should be set so that the price of the house becomes just the price of the house - the cost of the materials and labor. The land value should drop to zero. You then take that money, maybe use some of it for some public goods, might use some of it to get rid of bad taxes like property, income and sales, then give the rest back just as with the carbon tax.
The transition needs to be done with care(I heavily like giving everyone tax credits equal to the current value of their land, others like phasing in the tax over decades), but once we are in a land value tax environment everyone will be better off.
"The land tax should be set so that the price of the house becomes just the price of the house - the cost of the materials and labor."
How is that even possible? The root cause of property values being high in specific areas is because demand is high. Without changing demand, I don't see how it can just be labor and materials, especially since the buyer will be paying land value tax as well (since it's not a condo, high rise apartments, etc).
An income tax discourages you from earning money. A land value tax discourages you from using land. Using land more efficiently allows more people to live in that area.
I find proposals to reduce land value close to $0 extreme. After all, it would require some absurd tax rate like 100000% land value tax. The value of the land is 2k€ at 100% LVT representing the maximum in taxes one would pay for the property. At 100000% the payment is still 2k€ but the value of the land is now 2€ and you are paying 1000x on top of that land value in land value taxes. This means you can purchase the land for very little upfront. However, a 100% LVT would be more than sufficient because people can easily afford to prepay one year of taxes.
Let me give an example. Let's say there is currently a property in San Francisco. It's 2100 SQ/FT, it's current market value is $2.5 million, and the house is appraised by insurance for $500k.
The most optimal result, the result that we call 100% LVT(although 101% is much worse than 99%, so we try to aim cautiously) - is if the new market price after a LVT is implemented is $500k. Maybe that means a $24000/year tax. Maybe it means more. We keep raising the tax until the sale price asymptotes at the value of the improvements. Let's say it ends up at $24000/year. $24000/year is the value of the positive externalities that is being captured by this property, and we are therefore taxing the entirety of it.
It might help to also show you the lot next to it[0]. It's totally unimproved. It's going for $2 million. The goal for the land value tax is if the new sale price of that lot is $0. You'll note that if you try to do some math of current sale price to get some tax percent, you can't ever really get to zero. It would need to be an infinite percent tax. But that's because the tax is not based on the market price, but a set amount based on the lot. Because we know the lot next door is exactly the same size, and we know this lot is verrry very slightly closer to a train line, and we can see the general trend of the city is that lots closer to the train are worth more, so this lot based on some algorithm might be $24005/year, and we confirm that when someone buys it for $0. If someone bids thousands of dollars for it, next year we adjust the tax on it slightly up.
An increase in the tax of the land reduces the purchase price of the land.
It's the exact same thing in reverse with interest rates over time. As mortgage interest rates drop, the monthly payment is what people look at, so home prices go up.
I doubt that would actually occur. People with deep pockets could buy it up because they don't care about the tax. They'll just pass the cost on to renters anyways.
The reason that most taxes can be passed on is because as price is raised, the supply and demand curve is pushed and less is made. With land, there is a finite supply, none can be created, none can be destroyed, so land value taxes can not be passed on.
As the land value will always be zero, there is little value in holding land that you are not using productively, so speculation will drop heavily.
The reform of zoning laws (atleast in California) is blocked by property owners sitting on low-tax properties.
Raising the land value tax would be a surefire way to make the opposition disappear as property owners would have to scramble to make their land more productive.
Yes, LVT solves problems at multiple levels (removes barriers to zoning reforms and incentivizes more productive use of land).
It’s also politically difficult to get passed. However, it seems if we were to try to turn the tide on just one policy, it would be LVT, as it solves a lot of other political problems downstream.
The author likely isn't aware of that. If the author made that argument then it would undermine their argument about affecting people's choices minimally or not at all.