It's also whether it matters if you have people available to replace the things. Any conflict that gets to the point of taking out satellites will almost certainly trigger Kessler syndrome, at which point whether you can launch any more satellites becomes moot.
For anyone else reading this and rolling their own crypto (hint: don't! No really, just don't!):
>a lax PKCS#1 v1.5 RSA signature verifier that failed to enforce the total encoded length (256 bytes) or pin the digest to its correct length for the claimed hash, allowing an attacker to forge a valid-looking signature without the private key
the correct way to do this is encode-then-memcmp(). You can't get it wrong that way because a memcmp() only has two outcomes, match or no match, not a whole range of "seems to work OK on the tests we ran it on".
It's also a biased, lopsided report. Guy I know who was an EV pioneer in California said it was so bad that, even though his career consisted of promoting EVs, he told people to avoid watching it because it presents such a skewed picture. Imagine it's been made by Michael Moore to put it into perspective. From what I can remember, and this was 20 years ago, his summary was that the EV1 was introduced purely to meet the ZEV mandate but in practice the vehicles were "saleproof" (his words). There wasn't any conspiracy to kill them.
Just beware that an awful lot of "silicone" cabling coming from China is actually overplasticized PVC, particular cabling used in instrument probes. It feels like silicone until it starts getting stiff while at the same time outgassing plasticizer like crazy, or you touch it with a soldering iron or similar. I would expect most or even all of the cat-ran-across-the-keyboard Amazon brands to be overplasticized PVC, not silicone (hint: Use the Knockoff plugin for Chromefox, https://github.com/Shpigford/knockoff, which will warn you for stuff that's sold on Temu West, aka.Amazon, it's warning on almost all of the pseudo-brands listed in the article).
I've also run into way too much cabling that's CCA or even CCS. Garbage on the outside, garbage on the inside.
If you're interested in insulators you may also be interested in the telegraph poles that they're mounted on, for which we have the Telegraph Pole Appreciation Society, https://www.telegraphpoleappreciationsociety.org/. Do sign up, it's only UKP 10 for lifetime memebership.
RSA-1024 is approx 6 bits more security than the RSA-260 challenge, so ~64x more work to factor. That is negligible by cryptographic standards.
We don't know yet how much work OP put into factoring the RSA-260 challenge. No doubt it was a lot, but probably done with general purpose GPU hardware. That will continue to get cheaper to mount in the near future, and we ought to assume that nation states have access to RSA factoring hardware that would be multiple orders of magnitude more efficient.
It is quite likely that there are at least two actors (US and China) that can break RSA-1024, and they are no doubt working through a priority list of all accessible servers with such weak keys. If your firewall is not broken & now back-doored, it is only because you're not important enough to have gotten to yet.
RSA-2048 (or better, RSA-3072) is usually a drop-in replacement. ECC would be even better. There is no reason not to.
You are right that there are better options and there is no excuse not to choose something better today. But that’s not what GP is arguing! It’s just that: For any given interest level there is no way that expending the resources to attack the RSA key is valuable! You are either willing to expend resources then attacking the owner is far cheaper or not then you are also not investing weeks-to-month of cluster time.
And from that perspective RSA-1024 is still perfectly adequate
You don't know that. We're at the point where the NSA can assuredly break RSA-1024. We know they have sufficient processing power, and it would be silly of them not to have developed that capability.
"But they're not going to spend resources breaking my router!" No, not your router specifically. But batch GCD gives sqrt speedup over multiple keys, potentially 10's to 100's of millions of keys at once with off-the-shelf GPU clusters at NSA scale. Looking at that many keys at once tends to discover low-entropy biases common in consumer router hardware, which makes brute-forcing new keys from those devices trivial to do.
If you are actually operating a service relying on RSA-1024 security, it is almost certainly pwoned.
> If you are actually operating a service relying on RSA-1024 security, it is almost certainly pwoned.
If you're running something with code from a large US corporation, or outsourced to contractors, or made in China, or with a web interface, or [3 more pages of stuff] and your main worry is the size of your RSA keys, then I've got a Fortigate security appliance to sell you.
There's also the question of why anyone would bother. You can factor RSA-1024 today in about a year with a national-lab-level supercomputer. Which 1k-bit RSA key would you shut down a national lab for a year for to factor? Heck, which key would you shut it down for a week for to factor? There's no single key out there of any interest when you can just spear-phish your intended target, or get RCE on their unpatched router, or get the cleaners to plug in a USB key and let it do its thing while they're vaccuuming, or whatever.
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