Subgraph was started in part based on concerns with Tails that the authors might be too nice to pursue publicly. I'd personally be wary of both projects.
Subgraph is meant to be used as an installed OS with hardened containers/grsecurity while TAILS is a live Debian system maintained by anonymous developers without any of the grsec patches or containerization.
If you really need to not have your ID leaked, like the UAE recently going after dissidents with state malware, you'd want to use something like Subgraph with a seperate firewall/NAT internal address as insurance (pref running OpenWRT or a BSD not the default proprietary lighthttp server 'admin portal' firmware running with full privs).
Huh? Which NCC consultant would that be? Neither Bruce Leidl nor David Mirza have ever worked with NCC, or, for that matter, iSEC or Matasano or Intrepidus.
> as there is no traditional DNS system available to provide easy to remember hostname addresses
I think in future reworkings of TOR a decent DNS apparatus will be one of its features. Usually 'hacks' like this are made obsolete if the hack is repeatedly used and has reached a saturation point. One example of that is how ICANN now allows for any number of novelty gTLDs and I rarely see domain hacks now because of this (Think of using .delicious instead of del.icio.us).