It’s the fact that the institutions e.g. Congress, Judiciary are not able or willing to push back. And so we are seeing retribution for First Amendment activities e.g. protests being widespread despite it being clearly unconstitutional.
Project 2025 was right in that if you flood the zone the system won’t be responsive enough to stop you.
This happened continuously during the Biden administration when they formed an entire network of public-private censorship and liberals told us “freedom of speech does not mean freedom of reach.” You can also reference the entire saga of Russiagate, and litany of lawfare against Trump that was looking for every and any way to jail him and his family.
Anybody know where the fuck the opt out button is? I literally can't find it on mobile
Edit: For anyone else struggling to find it, look for the box with the heading "Profile URL". There's a link in the upper right corner of the box that says "Visibility Settings". It's light grey text and kinda hard to notice that's a link.
Just for anyone else, if you're forcing users to opt out of something like this it should be a BIG BUTTON AT THE TOP OF THE PAGE.
But as the programmer finds bugs and corrects them, they are simultaneously generating more, accurate data for training. So over time this should theoretically improve
I'm sure in the early days of compilers (I wasn't around back then, so I'm just assuming) they could also be fairly unreliable. Maybe they translated something in a completely idiotic way, lots of bugs, etc... But over time they improved and improved to the point that 99% of programmers never worry about anything except high level abstractions. This could be signalling the beginning of another such paradigm shift to a higher level abstraction
Would that that were the case (compilers getting better). See http://embed.cs.utah.edu/csmith/
C compilers for the PDP-11 were pretty good if only because they were both simple, single threaded, and C was essentially a verbose version of the PDP-11 instruction set. Languages got more abstract and instruction sets (including their models of execution) got more complex. Optimizing the compilation of an abstraction with a faulty understanding of either the abstraction or the instruction set (or both) begets bugs you can't see as reported in the reference above. OB: I personally would like to see these folks point their AI code machine at netlib including the Collected Algorithms of the ACM. Generating numerical methods code is, in my experience, not the same as generating much of what is found on Github.
I don't think people are upset about the repo being "archived" and having lost access to the issue, per se. I think people are (justifiably) furious because you offer a product which is fundamentally insecure in it's current state and seem to refuse to fix it. And it's not that websites which are using your product are susceptible to attacks, but that a malicious website can impersonate your product and it will be indistinguishable from a legitimate site. Let that sink in. A malicious website can be indistinguishable from a legitimate customer of yours, and users WILL enter their banking information. That is the heart of people's completely justified outrage here, and it's baffling that anybody on your security team could have possibly signed off on this. If people on your security team don't see the problem here they should be immediately fired and never work in the security field again. You guys better have some really expensive lawyers, because it feels like you are being criminally negligent here and should absolutely be held liable when some users inevitably have their lives destroyed as a result.
If you're looking for cryptographic signatures on container images, check out what my company Sylabs.io is doing. I wrote a comment on the other HN thread about this breach: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19769590
> We don't fine banks for being robbed. It's the robbers fault something bad happened, not the bank's.
No, we don't fine banks for being robbed. However, if the bank had clearly insufficient security on their vault, was notified of this being a problem, and made zero efforts to fix the problem then yes they should be held liable.
The company I work for, Sylabs, is taking what I think to be a pretty great approach to solving this problem. Essentially we've introduced a container image format where the actual runtime filesystem can be cryptographically signed (you can read about that here: https://www.sylabs.io/2018/03/sif-containing-your-containers...). The Singularity container runtime we develop treats this concept of "end-to-end integrity" as a core philosophy. Our docker hub analogue, the container Library, is working to make cryptographic signing one of the fundamentals of a container workflow. We're also actively working on container image encryption, which I think will bump container integrity up a few notches.