Probably so. At some point I won some maths-heavy economy textbooks in an undergraduate probability theory competition. It was last updated a few years before 2008 (I would guess no later than 2004), and it is mainstream enough to be a gift agreed upon by large-finance sponsors and financial-applied probability theory professors.
While explaining the market models, the book had quite a few footnotes that briefly mentioned incentive structures at different levels (individual traders, groups inside a company, mortgage-issuers that unload all of the risk…) Sometimes it stayed politically correct («it remains to be seen how this incentive structure will affect market stability»), sometimes not (especially when there were enough historical examples of exactly the same incentive structure leading to the same problems), but it made clear that principal-agent problems in the then-current (and now-current) economy are well-known and easy to describe in mainstream economics.
Last time when nobody cared about a broken nest of security holes in the center of the Web, a small minority had organised a campaign to annoy people with complaints.
I mean Mozilla's campaign asking users to send complaints to each and every webmaster writing IE5-only sites. It somewhat worked.
5% false discovery rate is true if the apriori probability of each result is 50%. If a journal wants to publish only surprising results, and accepts p=0.05 with a good methodology as true, it will have higher rate of false claims, because the most interesting things are more surprising than a coin toss.
And if you slice the data from a single experiment in 40 independent ways, your chances to get something with purely random significance p<0.05 are better than 50% for a single study…
It doesn't "mean" that the a priori is 50%, I guess what you want to say is that if we consider the a priori probabilities are equal between the two hypothesis, then we can use the 5% p-value.
But if the probability of the hypothesis is much less likely, we might need a p-value much lower to be sure.
Edit: my comment doesn't mean much since you edited your first sentence.
What does the calculation of advantage mean there? The advantage per one nice and one naughty roll (a pair of rolls) is multiplied by the total number of single rolls in a 4-player game.
And I guess an honest player would pick the nice locations as often as naughty ones (there is no reason to actually prefer them). I don't know the rules, so I don't know if there are enough naughty locations to roll only on them without _that_ being suspicious.
If the only trace a criminal activity leaves is on a single encrypted drive, is it important if it gets prosecuted or not?
The police does parallel construction to avoid admitting access to illegally collected evidence, civil forfeiture to punish people for things police doesn't like without having to prove anything, etc — incentives for police to step over the rules are a larger problem than unbreakable encryption right now.
Could you please mention the number of amendment that restricts the right to refuse self-incrimination in the same way as the 13th amendment restricted the right to own slaves?
Supporting or undermining it by unpaid distribution of its disgusting output material? If he was directly supporting it, he would be already convicted based on tracing the payments, I guess.
And if obtaining and distributing the output material of a content industry without payment is supporting the industry, let that be put in writing…
I think the effect described in the text has another side: imagine that at some point using XYZ was obviously a bad idea for multiple reasons for a specific person in specific circumstances. Obviously, keeping track of the changes in XYZ will have a lower priority for a person who is not going to use XYZ anyway, even if one of the multiple show-stoppers gets fixed/changed/redesigned. This means that the person's opinion about XYZ slowly gets stale.
While explaining the market models, the book had quite a few footnotes that briefly mentioned incentive structures at different levels (individual traders, groups inside a company, mortgage-issuers that unload all of the risk…) Sometimes it stayed politically correct («it remains to be seen how this incentive structure will affect market stability»), sometimes not (especially when there were enough historical examples of exactly the same incentive structure leading to the same problems), but it made clear that principal-agent problems in the then-current (and now-current) economy are well-known and easy to describe in mainstream economics.