If you've not listened to Dan Carlin's 6-part series on the Great War, take the time to do so. The "whys" and "hows" of World War I are much harder to get your head around than WWII...it's just much less linear. Not only does he do an excellent job of making the mechanics of the war understandable, he draws the element of humanity into stark relief by interspersing explanations of troop movements with first hand accounts of the suffering and carnage men sustained.
Carlin's comparison of something as simple as the uniforms at the beginning and end is great. The initial movements were with these gauche Napoleonic clothes: Red feathers in tall hats, bright blue coats, shiny shoes and whatnot. At the end, all pretense had left. Modern war and the very functional uniforms were here to stay.
Carlin's recounting of the German march into Belgium. He talks of an American account of a Belgian town on the border with Germany. The army that came though had to do so for over a day. There was a long unbroken march that went on for 24 hours, that was how many troops the Germans had come through just one town. The metal on their boots sparked off the cobblestones causing a drumming march of sparks all night.
His accounts of Paschendale. The gas had turned the mud a toxic yellow. He recounts descriptions of the battlefield as a marshmallow. German boys would just sink into the mud and become unable to be pulled out in the toxic sludge. Their screams would last days as they succumbed to the mud. Carlin goes into some detail of the smell of Pachendale as a result. No more true description of Hell itself can be found.
My god, what a good series to scare any person away from war. It really was as if Hell itself came out of the interior of the earth. It was a giant art experiment or something to as accurately as possible make Dante's Inferno real and then improvise. It really is hard to realize the horror.
Agreed on Dan Carlin and if i may add TheGreatWar youtube channel. https://www.youtube.com/user/TheGreatWar They have videos from the british pathé and do week to week 100 years ago to today recaps.
There is a lot of stuff and it won't end for a few years. Also interesting is they cover things like the infantry uniforms, the guns in use at the time etc.. Highly recommended.
And if you prefer very long and dense text, I'd strongly recommend John Keegan's "The First World War" - similar to your description, it really gets into the human reality of the war with first-hand sources.
It really isn't by the standards of history books though. It's very readable because it does get into the human reality as opposed to endless facts. It's probably the best single book on WWI that I've come across.
DC is a great storyteller, something missing in many other history themed audiobooks/podcasts/etc. My favorite series of his is either "Wrath Of The Khans" or "Ghosts of the Ostfront". The WWI series was also fantastic, but did feel like he kind of sped the pacing up in the last episode a bit, discussing the end of the war. I have a feeling after some of the previous series had run on so long, he wanted to cap this one at 6 even-length episodes.
Agreed regarding Carlin's storytelling ability. I tried to get into The History of Rome podcast after Blueprint for Armageddon and just couldn't engage. Got spoiled by Dan.
I too was disappointed in the speed with which the last two years of the war were covered. Of course being an American I wanted to hear more about Pershing, the Marines and the Battle of Bellau Wood, Frank Duke, Eddie Rickenbacker, etc.
I recall reading/hearing an interview with Carlin prior to the release of the last episode where he explained that they were going to finish the series up even if it meant it was a 15 hour sixth episode. So you're right, I think they were definitely rushing the last couple of years.
I think it's a testament to the complexity of the war, though that the first two years really required 15 hours to explain adequately. I'm on my third listening through and still feel like there's so much I don't have straight yet.
An important reason why the fight was so bitter over seemingly small amounts of land that this article (and others) seem to miss is that a relatively limited area of northern France amounted to over half of the country's industrial production. Coal and steel in particular, critical to the war effort were overwhelmingly produced there.
Any incremental part of this region lost to the Germans wasn't just a symbolic loss of ground or a moral defeat, it meant a real long term resource loss which could tilt the balance of the war in Germany's favour. In comparison, the allies were largely unable to strike Germany's industrial centers. It's quite easy to depict all senior commanders of the time as inflexible and stubborn (some of them were, to various extents anyway), but there's more to it than that.
Defence in depth just wasn't an option, and mechanised war was a fiction anyway. With the benefit of hindsight, and ignoring the industrial value of the North, it's easy to jump to simple but wrong conclusions about why the war was fought that way.
There were reasons for the way the fighting was conducted too, and the popular idea of "trench warfare" being the norm on the Western Front for the whole 1914-1918 stretch is misleading. As with pretty much everything in life, things were a little more complicated than that.
The excellent /r/askhistorians forum has had some good coverage of this area in the past. Try this overview for a start:
Indeed, much of the criticism seems to be centered around the general theme of, "Charging machine guns over open ground didn't work the last 300 times we tried it, but maybe today will be the day."
With enough artillery and men it actually did work in many cases. The large scale assaults regularly made progress measured in miles. The problem was that you couldn't meaningfully continue an advance or exploit a breakthrough. Once you left your trenches you also left your supply lines. The enemy could respond to any breakthrough with overwhelming force mobilized by their own rails and roads.
Unfortunately, they were limited by the technology of the day - not the lack of mechanized forces, but the lack of portable radios. Charging across the no-man's land, while high in casualties, usually worked for getting an initial penetration of the other side's trench system, but without radio to coordinate reinforcements, artillery support, and a further exploitation of the breakthrough they would quickly fall to counterattacks. And then the bloodiest bit of the offensive, the initial breakthrough, would have to be repeated again.
Yeah i recall reading about how they would attempt to roll telegraph wire out as they advanced, only to have it snag on something or get cut by artillery blasts.
I think it did relate to mobility and supply chains as well. But, yes, the bottom line is that costly long-planned breakthroughs invariably ended up getting bogged down.
Sometimes the objectives for a battle are a little more complicated than breaking through - holding actions, diversions, rearguards etc.
The British Expeditionary Force, and lots of the regular French Army, was sacrificed to blunt the initial German advance. British commanders were clear that the completely new army they were building would not be ready until 1916/7 but a mix of politics and necessity meant they had to be sent in earlier. Allegations that Britain would "fight to the last drop of Russian blood" - which had echoes of the Napoleonic wars - threatened to undermine the alliance.
The British attacks during Verdun were to relieve pressure on the French by diverting resources elsewhere. Every German machine gun, soldier and shell diverted away reduced French casualties. Given the horrific conditions and casualties there was a real risk of either a French mutiny or the Government deciding it could no longer pay the price. In the harsh logic of the time the losses at the Somme were a price that had to be paid to keep the allies in the war.
Petain was not the only reason why French officers started sparing men. The early French officers were professional army men, who cultivated the tradition of charging the enemy directly, a suicidal exercise at the age of machine guns. But they not only forced their men to do so, they charged the enemy themselves too. As a result most of them died in the first year of the conflict. They were then replaced with drafted civilians who didn't share this chivalrous conception of war.
The other main reason is that as the men hardened with experience, not only were they reluctant to participate in a mass suicide, but French officers started to be increasingly killed by "friendly fire", which somewhat tempered their strategy.
The early French officers were professional army men, who cultivated the tradition of charging the enemy directly, a suicidal exercise at the age of machine guns. But they not only forced their men to do so, they charged the enemy themselves too. As a result most of them died in the first year of the conflict. They were then replaced with drafted civilians who didn't share this chivalrous conception of war.
One historian I heard (not sure how accurate this is) said the British Army had a parallel but somewhat inverted experience. Before the war the British Army was much smaller than eg the French or German armies, but was very professional and had adapted well to modern weaponry and tactics in both attack and defence.
The trouble was that at the beginning of the war, the war was expected to be over quickly so the British command didn't worry about sending nearly all its officers (and their institutional knowledge) to France for the experience and 'adventure'.
It didn't work out as planned though and after getting bogged down and suffering many casualties very quickly, the huge job of training lots of new officers and soldiers was left to an older generation of ex officers back home who reverted to the older tactics. It didn't take long for the British army to revert to those ineffective suicidal charges too.
If anyone has an opportunity to visit the Verdun area, please do. It's surreal. The landscape is still scarred by the war. It feels like you're on the moon. Craters, pieces of metal still sticking out of the ground, bunkers... undoubtedly wherever you are walking there are probably soldiers buried beneath you.
I grew up at/near Verdun, and we regularly find active shells (53 millions used during the battle), ammo, bayonets... A large part of the area is forbidden ("zone rouge" in french). WWI devastated the Meuse county.
Today, some kids do camping in abandoned forts ;)
I visited a few years ago. Haunting and surreal. Here's a few of my photos, they don't do it justice except to show the craters and pieces of metal like you described.
Some of the Bosnian countryside is similarly pocked and then grassed over. I wasn't sure when driving through a few years ago if that was a remnant of war or a natural feature?
In college, I had the chance to take a trip with students in the history department to WW1 battle sites, but unfortunately could not go due to it overlapping with an internship in my major. Seemed like the more responsible choice at the time. But in retrospect, I should have taken the trip.
I found the use of the word "legend" a bit confusing. Since I'm not a native speaker, I looked it up in the Oxford Dictionary [1], but still, none of the meaning seem to be applicable here:
1. A traditional story sometimes popularly regarded as historical but not authenticated.
2. The story of a saint’s life.
3. An extremely famous or notorious person, especially in a particular field.
4. An inscription, especially on a coin or medal.
5. A caption.
6. The wording on a map or diagram explaining the symbols used
My initial association was along the lines of 1., and so I was afraid to read an article doubtful of historical consent -- but that was not the case. Neither was the article about a singled-out person which could give rise to 3. The last three definitions clearly refer to a different kind of legend altogether.
Could someone with a better intuition please explain how the title of this article is meant to be understood?
and since 3. refers to a single person).
I'm not sure that the word is quite right in this context but it basically refers to the fact that the event is deeply embedded in the national consciousness and that it appears to provide lessons that may not be correct ones. It's a variant of meaning 1. The sense in which that applies is probably best given by these paragraphs:
What were the lessons of Verdun, if any? In 1940, Hitler’s smart new generals, such as Heinz Guderian, tackled the problem of static warfare with a blitzkrieg technique of fast-moving armoured attack. They went round the side, and back, of Maginot’s costly fortresses, making them capitulate without firing a shot. Verdun fell in a matter of hours, France after a six-week campaign. But Hitler missed the main point, militarily: never make a fetish of any fortress, any stronghold, so that you become committed to hold it however unacceptable the costs.
The capture of Verdun in 1916 would have been unlikely to have caused France to lose the war. Yet in the Second World War, Hitler’s orders to his generals not to surrender an inch of ground, led to repeated disasters – beginning with the sacrifice of Friedrich Paulus’s entire 6th Army at Stalingrad, which eventually brought about the destruction of the Third Reich.
And yet, in the heart of the French army, the myths and the slogans of Verdun, chimeric as they were, persisted well into the 1950s. Brave young paras died at Dien Bien Phu in the First Indochina War with Verdun on their lips.
The "Legend of Verdun" works better than the "Legendary Battle of Verdun"...because the point of the article is how keeping Verdun is a point of pride for the French...and yet not only did it involve a terrible loss of life, it wasn't much worth fighting for. But the "legend" part is how the pride over keeping Verdun -- i.e. the idea that holding a fortress is important -- had echoes in later military blunders of pride, such as Hilter at Stalingrad and the French, again, at Dien Bien Phu.
I agree with all the answers that have been posted so far, but I think it is worth pointing out that, in idiomatic usage, an event or person may be described as legendary even when the facts are well-known.
The way it works is this: many historically-important legends have a basis in important events in a people's history, when bold and resourceful action saved the day, but the story tends to exaggerate the glory. A recent event may be described as legendary if it has those properties to a degree that is normally only seen in legends, and the same goes for the primary actors in those actions. An example that comes to mind is Shackleton and his rescue of his crew, a legend in the history of exploration.
I mention this because of the sentence 'Yet over the interwar years it justly came to be seen as France’s “finest hour.”' (my emphasis.) I think that here, the author is saying that the battle reached legendary status within the French national psyche, without implying that this is a misreading of history.
To be clear, I agree that if Maginot's enthusiasm for forts was a result of Verdun, the author is saying that was a misreading of history. As for Hitler's "no retreat" doctrine, I think the point is that he was, for his own reasons, making the same mistake as the generals at Verdun: I doubt that his attitude owed much, if anything, specifically to that battle (he was at the Somme at the time.)
In this case, I'd say it's a combination of definition 1 and 3.
The "story" of the Battle of Verdun is definitely quite famous and is part of the larger narrative around WWI. While it's obviously not a person, it has some of the legendary aspects that fit into definition 3.
In general, the popular definition of "legend" includes practically any aspect of popular history.
I am named after my great-grandfather who perished here along with so many of his compatriots. He died at Fort Douaumont, as I recall, as the German soldiers shot into the tunnels of the fort. He had three children and was around forty years old. My grandmother never knew her father. These tragedies resonate throughout generations. Astonishingly, it is possible to find his death certificate online [1].
I think of the problems with American politics today is that our politicians cast many problems in the context of WWII (ISIS are as bad as Nazis; any negotiation with Iran would constitute another Munich). If they were using WWI as the analogy, they would come to very different conclusions.
I wonder what the world would look like if WWII had never happened. Nobody came out of WWI feeling good about the results, and a lot of people were determined that it should never be repeated; but WWII gave us a lovely tidy narrative of good vs. evil that arguably restored a lot of shine to the idea of glorious, heroic battle, at least in places that had not actually been devastated by it (e.g. the USA).
I'm not clear which of my points you disagree with.
Also, there were three Axis Powers in WW2, and two of them had fought against Germany in WW1. It's overly simplistic to say that post-war suffering in Germany was the sole cause of WW2--especially as there were terrible sanctions after that war as well, but Germany has not gone to war again.
I don't buy the good v. evil position on WW2. The problem with WW1 is that it was a stalemate or a pause. All parties involved were weakened, but the status quo continued. The old 19th century system carried on, bereft of its youth and treasure.
Europe was all about Germany being stuck between a rock (the post-war sanctions) and a hard place (the threat of the communist revolution that Germany implanted to defeat the Czar to the money men in Germany). Italy was a sideshow.
The difference in the post-WW2 era, and the reason we didn't have WW3 in 1960 is simple. The US emerged triumphant and essentially occupied or otherwise controlled all of the powers, save China and the Soviet Union. As the US loosened control, mutually assured destruction made WW1/WW2 style "total war" too costly.
At this point the US is just getting upset over 128 citizens being killed on the RMS Lusitania when it was sunk during a period of unrestricted submarine warfare. Our entry into the war as an Associated Power won't take place until 6 April 1917.
I finished the article but went immediately to Google for "Fort Douaumont", to learn more details of "the world’s most impregnable fort, [which] was, by a series of almost incredible errors in February 1916, virtually undefended" and the recapture of which "is estimated to have cost the French as many as 100,000 men".
> Kunze and his men reached the fort's moat and found that the wall casemates ("coffres") defending the moat were unoccupied. Kunze managed to climb inside one of them to open an access door. But his men refused to go inside the fortifications as they feared an ambush. Armed only with a bolt-action rifle, the Pioneer-Sergeant entered alone. He wandered around the empty tunnels until he found the artillery team, captured them and locked them up.
> By now, another group from the Brandenburg regiment, led by reserve-officer Lieutenant Radtke, was also entering the fort through its unoccupied defences. Radtke then made contact with Kunze's troops and organised them before they spread out, capturing a few more French defenders and securing the fort. Later, more columns of German troops under Hauptman Haupt and Oberleutnant von Brandis arrived. No shots were ever fired in the capture of Fort Douaumont. The only casualty was one of Kunze's men who scraped one of his knees.
Episode IV focuses on Verdun and can be listened to as a stand alone episode but the rest of the series is very much worth the time. http://www.dancarlin.com/product/hardcore-history-53-bluepri...